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Abstract
Douglas Ehring (2011) has proposed a conception of natural classes of tropes 
to fulfill the roles usually attributed to universals. Natural classes of tropes can 
avoid the difficulties that affect the classic theory of tropes – as claimed by 
D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell – where tropes are simple and, by themselves, 
are particulars and have an intrinsic nature. Natural classes of tropes are 
also preferable to primitive resemblance classes of tropes, because they can 
explain the characteristics of the relation of resemblance and can also ground 
an internal relation of resemblance between tropes. It is contended here that 
the conception proposed works very differently whether tropes are conceived 
as modifier tropes or as module tropes. In the first case, tropes cannot be 
grouped directly in natural classes, because tropes have no intrinsic character. 
They ground the character possessed by their bearer, but they themselves have 
none. So, the character attributed to a trope due to its belonging to a natural 
class is dependent, on its turn, on the natural classes or the resemblance 
classes into which the objects that bear those tropes enter. In the second case, 
tropes do have a character. Then, they can enter ‘directly’ into natural classes. 
The problem in this case, though, is that tropes seem to have many different 
characters and seem vulnerable to the traditional problems of the ‘imperfect 
community’ and the ‘company’ that affect resemblance nominalism. 
Keywords: properties, tropes, natural classes, resemblance classes, problem 
of the imperfect community, problem of the company.
Resumo 
Douglas Ehring (2011) propôs uma concepção de classes naturais de tropos para 
cumprir as funções normalmente atribuídas a universais. As classes naturais de 
tropos podem evitar as dificuldades que afetam a clássica teoria dos tropos - como 
alegado por D.C. Williams e Keith Campbell - onde tropos são simples e, por si 
mesmos, são particulares e têm uma natureza intrínseca. As classes naturais de 
tropos são também preferíveis às primitivas classes de semelhança de tropos, 
porque elas podem não só explicar as características da relação de semelhança, 
como também podem fundamentar uma relação interna de semelhança entre 
tropos. Argumenta-se aqui que a concepção proposta aplica-se de forma muito 
diferente a depender se os tropos são concebidos como tropos modificadores 
ou como tropos módulos. No primeiro caso, tropos não podem ser agrupados 
diretamente em classes naturais, porque tropos não têm caráter intrínseco. Eles 
fundamentam o caráter de seu portador, mas eles mesmos são desprovidos de 
caráter. Assim, o caráter atribuído a um tropo devido à sua pertença a uma classe 
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natural é dependente, por sua vez, das classes naturais ou das classes semelhantes 
em que os objetos que possuem esses tropos se inserem. No segundo caso, tropos 
têm um caráter. Deste modo, eles podem entrar “diretamente” em classes naturais. 
O problema, neste caso, porém, é que os tropos parecem ter muitos carácteres 
diferentes e parecem vulneráveis aos problemas tradicionais da “comunidade 
imperfeita” e da “companhia” que afetam a semelhança nominalista.
Palavras-chave: propriedades, tropos, classes naturais, classes de semelhança, 
problema da comunidade imperfeita, problema da companhia.
Many have defended the view that universals can be eliminated, or reduced by 
classes of tropes, i.e. classes of individual properties2. Douglas Ehring has presented 
one of the more recent and sophisticated defenses of this idea (cf. 2011, 173-241). 
Tropes seem to be an attractive alternative to traditional ontologies with universal 
properties and objects, and also to traditional nominalistic ontologies that only pos-
tulate particular objects. In contrast with the first ones, an ontology where classes 
of tropes fulfill the functions attributed to universals does not require any weird 
entity located – in its entirety – in different disconnected regions of space-time. In 
opposition to the second ones, tropes are entities with much more delicate condi-
tions of identity than objects. Traditional objections directed against, for example, 
resemblance nominalism, do not appear so forcefully against ontologies with tropes3. 
In the ‘classical’ theories of tropes as they are presented, for example, in the 
works of D. C. Williams (1953a, 1953b) and Keith Campbell (1981, p. 483-485; 1990, 
p. 38-40), the functions of universals are fulfilled by classes of tropes all resembling 
each other. In these classical presentations the relation of resemblance – or quasi-
relation, if you prefer – is an internal relation that does not imply any ontological 
addition. Several problems have appeared for this conception (cf. Moreland, 2001, 
p. 50-73). Ehring is defending a view that is much better prepared to resist them. 
First, he contends that if resemblance classes of tropes are going to be postulated, 
the resemblance relation should be primitive and external. But, second, natural 
classes of tropes are for him even better for the theoretical functions envisaged. 
With natural classes of tropes, the characteristics of the relation of resemblance can 
be explained and should not be taken as a matter of brute primitive facts. 
In the first part of this work Ehring’s position and its alleged advantages will 
be presented. Then, in the second part, several problems of Ehring’s position will 
be discussed and assessed. 
Advantages of natural classes of tropes
The classical theory sustains that tropes are simple entities that, at the same 
time, are particular and have an intrinsic nature. If one considers a trope of exactly 
2 There is a subtle difference between these alternatives. If one ‘eliminates’ facts of kind A by facts of kind B, one 
is endorsing the view that there are no A-facts because there are only B-facts. If one ‘reduces’ facts of kind A by 
facts of kind B, instead, one is accepting that there are A-facts, but they are nothing more than B-facts. In this 
case, the difference depends on whether a defender of tropes will accept or not the existence of ‘universals’. 
One alternative for the friend of tropes is to sustain that classes of tropes constitute a base to which facts about 
universals can be ‘reduced’. So, in a sense, there are ‘universals’ – i.e. in a very general sense, there is something 
that is ‘one over many’ – but they are nothing but classes of tropes. Another alternative is to sustain that there 
are no universals, but there are classes of tropes that can fulfill the theoretical functions usually attributed to them 
(cf. for a similar distinction, Robb, 2005, p. 468). These alternatives will not be further considered in this work. 
3 For example, it has been contended that the traditional challenges of the ‘company’ and the ‘imperfect 
community’ do not appear when classes of resembling objects are replaced by classes of resembling tropes. 
Cf. Campbell, 1990, p. 32-34; but also cf. Manley, 2002.
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5 grams of mass, for example, the reason that explains why this trope resembles 
every other trope of exactly 5 grams of mass is only the intrinsic nature of the trope. 
In general, an internal relation is taken to be a relation that is supervenient on the 
intrinsic nature of the relata4. The ‘intrinsic nature’ of an object is the collection of 
its intrinsic properties. Then, any  possible world in which two objects, a1 and a2, 
have the same intrinsic properties is a possible world where they will be in the same 
internal relations. If, for example, a1 has a mass of exactly 5 grams and a2 has a mass 
of exactly 5.1 grams, then a1 is in the relation of having more mass than with a2. 
The fact that a1 is heavier than a2 is nothing besides the fact that a1 has the mass 
that it has and that a2 has the mass that it has. Tropes are individuals, so they seem 
apt for being in internal relations. Of course it makes  no sense to say that a trope 
of 5 grams of mass has the ‘intrinsic property’ of having 5 grams of mass, for the 
trope is the property. But for the trope of having 5 grams of mass the character by 
which it is the trope that it is, is simply its own intrinsic nature. Given their intrinsic 
natures, tropes resemble each other or don’t. Resemblance classes of tropes seem 
to be grounded in the intrinsic natures of the tropes that are part of those classes. 
Their natures are sufficient to determine the existence of the resemblance relations 
between the tropes. The resemblance classes that are supposed to work as universals, 
then, are the classes of all and only the tropes that resemble each other. 
An internal relation of resemblance is especially appropriate to avoid the 
regress that might affect the conception (cf. Maurin, 2002, p. 74-116). An internal 
relation is no addition of being to its grounding. Suppose, on the contrary, that the 
relation of resemblance were an external relation5 not supervenient to the natures 
of its relata and also a trope like any other. That is what one would expect if one 
defends the general conception that properties are tropes. If there is a genuine 
relation between tropes, then it should be a trope. But the tropes of resemblance 
between tropes resemble each other. Hence the resemblances between tropes of 
resemblance should also be tropes – they cannot be instantiations of a unique uni-
versal, for there are no universals. Then a regress is fired in which there are tropes 
of resemblance between tropes, and tropes of resemblance between resemblances 
between tropes, and tropes of resemblance between resemblances of resemblances 
between tropes, etcetera. Two strategies have been tried to stop this regress: (i) one 
can sustain that the facts of resemblance between tropes are primitive facts, not 
dependent on the intrinsic nature of the tropes involved and not further explainable 
by other facts6; and (ii) one can instead argue that the relation of resemblance is 
4 An internal relation has also been taken to be a relation essential for its relata. Cf. Maurin, 2002, p. p. 87-
91. For other alternative formulations of an ‘internal relation’ cf. Schaffer, 2010, p. 348-351. On the other 
hand, the notion of an ‘intrinsic property’ has been extremely debated. Probably, there is no unique concept 
of ‘intrinsic’ property but several. In what follows, an ‘intrinsic’ property will be understood as a property 
whose possession by an object is indifferent to the fact that the object is alone or accompanied. An object is 
‘alone’ in a possible world w if and only if there is no other object in w. An object is ‘accompanied’ in w if and 
only it is not alone in w. For this definition, cf. Lewis and Langton, 1999. There are several qualifications to 
this definition that are required to cover cases of disjunctive properties. It is not necessary to enter here into 
those qualifications because according to the conception of properties assumed here there are no disjunctive 
properties (cf. Armstrong, 1978b, p. 19-23). 
5 An external relation will be taken to be just a non-internal relation. Cf. for another formulation of the 
distinction, Lewis, 1983, p. 25-26. 
6 This kind of strategy has been developed by defenders of resemblance nominalism (cf. Lewis, 1999, p. 14-16; 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2002, p. 62-65). The facts about what properties each object has are facts about what other 
objects each one of them resembles – or doesn’t. It makes no sense in a nominalist conception to sustain that the 
resemblances between objects are grounded in their intrinsic natures, because there is no ‘nature’ of the objects 
besides the primitive facts about resemblances. Resemblances, hence, should be taken as external relations. The 
recourse to primitive facts of resemblance is justified for the nominalists because: (i) any theory has to postulate 
some or other primitive facts, and because (ii) defenders of immanent universals have also made recourse to a 
primitive ‘relation’ of instantiation that is not itself a universal (cf. Armstrong, 1978a, p. 108-111, 1997, p. 127).
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just an internal relation, implying no addition of being to the intrinsic natures of 
the relata, as Campbell has argued. A conception, then, with tropes that have an 
intrinsic nature that grounds internal relations of resemblance seems to be a very 
good systematic alternative to traditional ontologies of universals free of the dif-
ficulties haunting different forms of nominalism. 
But other problems compensate for these advantages of the classical con-
ception of tropes. Tropes are supposedly simple entities, at once (a) individual and 
(b) endowed with an intrinsic qualitative character. This simple but nonetheless 
dual nature of a trope in the classical conception leads to the “collapse-into-exem-
plification” objection (cf. Ehring, 2011, p. 177-184; Moreland, 2001, p. 53-71). The 
problem comes from the principle that a simple nature cannot be the grounding of 
two arbitrarily different internal relations. 
Non-Simplicity: if x1 is in two arbitrarily different internal relations with x2 due 
to its intrinsic nature, then the intrinsic nature of x1 is not simple. 
Suppose that an object, say a1, has two internal relations with a2: R1 and R2. 
Internal relations are grounded in the intrinsic nature of the relata. The intrinsic 
nature of x is constituted by all the intrinsic properties that x has. Then, all internal 
relations that x has with other objects should be grounded in the intrinsic properties 
of x. Leaving aside nominalist theories of properties, the same object a1 can have an 
intrinsic property of mass and an intrinsic property of shape. There is no problem, 
then, if a1 has the same mass as a2, but not the same shape as a2. The fact that a1 
has the same mass (R1) as a2 and does not have the same shape (R2) as a2, implies 
that a1 has an intrinsic nature that is not simple, because it should be constituted 
by different intrinsic properties of mass and shape.
It is part of our common conception of an object that it is thickly charactered, 
that is, it has different characteristics or, at least, it is capable of having different 
characteristics (cf. Garcia, 2011, p. 8-11). In contrast with an object – at least under 
our common conception – a trope is a thinly charactered entity. A trope is an entity 
that only has a unique character or confers a unique character to its bearer. A trope 
of mass cannot also be something that confers size and shape to its bearer. A trope 
of mass should only be something that confers the mass of its bearer. Nothing more. 
If tropes have, then, an intrinsic nature and if tropes are – furthermore – simple, not 
built up from a character and a ‘particularizer’ individual, then they cannot enter 
into arbitrarily different internal relations. But it seems that they do. 
Suppose two tropes t1 and t2. These tropes t1 and t2 perfectly resemble each 
other. But, also, these tropes t1 and t2 are different. By hypothesis, resemblance is 
an internal relation in the classical conception of tropes. But being different from 
also seems to be an internal relation, grounded in the intrinsic nature of its relata. 
Resemblance and difference are disconnected internal relations. They don’t seem 
to be grounded in the same intrinsic property. In effect, how could the same enti-
ties, tropes t1 and t2, ground two different internal relations between them? One 
can understand the case of the mass of an object that grounds the internal relation 
of having the same mass as a2 and the internal relation of having more mass than 
a3. But a situation is unintelligible in which a1 has the same mass as a2 and a1 has 
more mass than a2. By the principle of Non-Simplicity, then, both t1 and t2 have a 
non-simple intrinsic nature. They are not thinly charactered7. 
7 Ehring presents a second argument (cf. Ehring, 2011, p. 180-182) in which the principle by which the non-
simplicity of the intrinsic nature of tropes is derived has as antecedent the case when a single entity x1 has the 
internal relation of being perfectly resembling in respect to F1 with x2 and imperfectly resembling in respect 
to F2 with the same entity x2. It seems that this argument is not different from the previous one. The internal 
relations of being perfectly resembling in respect to F1 and imperfectly resembling in respect to F2 are just two 
arbitrarily different internal relations in the sense relevant for the principle of Non-Simplicity indicated above. 
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Suppose, further, two tropes t1 and t2. These tropes t1 and t2 imperfectly re-
semble each other. For example, t1 is a mass-trope of 5 grams, and t2 is a mass-trope 
of 10 grams. By hypothesis, imperfect resemblance is an internal relation in the 
classical conception of tropes. But these tropes also perfectly resemble each other 
in respect to being particulars. Perfectly resembling in respect to being particulars 
also seems to be an internal relation. Imperfectly resembling in mass and perfectly 
resembling in being particulars are disconnected internal relations. If tropes are really 
simple, how could they ground a perfect resemblance with respect to particularity 
and at the same time, and with the same object, ground an imperfect resemblance 
with respect to mass? By the principle of Non-Simplicity, then, both t1 and t2 have 
a non-simple intrinsic nature. They are not thinly charactered.  
It is not necessary to enter here into a more detailed consideration of the 
argument8. This paper is concerned with the alternative theory of properties as 
natural classes of tropes. The classical conception of tropes is affected by this 
argument. It does not seem coherent to sustain that tropes have an intrinsic quali-
tative character – and hence that resemblances between those tropes are internal 
relations – are individuals per se and are simple. Two conceptions, though, appear 
to resist the difficulty: (i) resemblance classes of tropes with an external relation 
of resemblance, and (ii) natural classes of tropes. In both of these conceptions, 
there is no intrinsic nature of the tropes by which the resemblances between 
them are grounded. The ‘nature’ of a trope by which, for example, it is a 5 gram 
trope, is not just the way it is intrinsically, but either its primitive resemblance to 
other tropes – i.e. all and only the 5-gram-of-mass tropes – or its pertaining to a 
natural class of tropes –again, the class of all and only the 5-gram-of-mass tropes. 
This strategy follows the usual maneuvers employed by nominalists. It inverts our 
common conception by which the resemblance is grounded in intrinsic natures, 
or by which the pertaining of something to a ‘natural’ class depends on a previ-
ous intrinsic nature of those elements that are deemed relevant for the group-
ing. Now, the ‘intrinsic nature’ in question is dependent on the primitive facts of 
resemblance or the pertaining to a natural class. 
It is easy to see that the argument against classical tropes won’t run against 
these new resemblance classes, nor against natural classes of tropes. Even if one 
accepts that difference between tropes and perfect resemblance in respect to par-
ticularity are, indeed, internal relations, now the relation of resemblance – perfect or 
imperfect – that gives rise to the resemblance classes that should work as universals 
is an external relation. It is now not sufficient to fire the principle of Non-Simplicity9. 
The same happens if instead of resemblance classes one appeals to natural classes 
of tropes. Pertaining to a class is certainly not an internal relation and does not 
suffice to fire Non-Simplicity.
8 In the cases presented against the simplicity of classical tropes it is assumed that (i) difference and (ii) 
resemblance in particularity are internal relations. Internal relations – in the sense taken here – are supervenient 
on intrinsic properties. Hence, if difference and resemblance are, in fact, internal relations, their groundings 
should be intrinsic properties. Under a sparse conception of properties (cf. Lewis, 1999, p. 10-14) there might 
be some reason to question this supposition. The grounding of the supposedly internal relation of difference 
should be the character by which each one of the entities related exists and is different from the others. It 
is not uncontroversial that existence can be taken to be a sparse property. The difference of one entity and 
another, on the other hand, if it is not grounded in different and incompatible intrinsic properties, has been 
taken to depend on a primitive haecceitas that doesn’t seem, either, to be an intrinsic sparse property. The 
same applies in the case of particularity – the character by which a particular is a particular. 
9 Ehring states correctly that Moreland was mistaken in this point (cf. Ehring, 2011, p. 181, note 12; Moreland, 
2001, p. 64). There is no problem with a simple character that grounds an internal relation with an entity and, 
at the same time, enters – directly or indirectly – into an external relation with the same entity. There is no 
problem at all, for example, with a mass trope heavier than another mass trope, but located at 1 meter from it. 
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Here there is a theoretical motivation for endorsing either external resemblance 
classes of tropes or natural classes of tropes. This is coherent with a general conception 
where there are no universal entities that can be multiply instantiated. It is coherent 
with a mono-categorial ontology with just one general kind of entity: tropes. It seems 
adequate to deal with the objection presented above haunting the classical concep-
tion of tropes. Ehring further contends that natural classes of tropes are preferable 
to (external) resemblance classes of tropes. There are two reasons for this contention: 
(a) If one accepts the existence of natural classes of tropes, resemblanc-
es between tropes are grounded in their intrinsic natures (cf. Ehring, 2011, 
p. 188-190). That is, the fact that tropes belong to certain natural classes endows 
them with a certain ‘intrinsic’ nature. That intrinsic nature grounds, afterwards, the 
fact that tropes resemble – or don’t – each other. Adopting the view that natural 
classes instead of resemblance classes of tropes are that which plays the role of 
universals allows one to accommodate the intuition that resemblance is grounded 
in intrinsic nature and not the other way round. 
(b) The formal characteristics of the relation of resemblance need not be 
something brute and primitive. They can be derived from the fact that tropes belong 
to different natural classes (cf. Ehring, 2011, p. 190-193). It is not necessary here to 
present the details of the derivation. Ehring contends that it can be shown that the 
relation of perfect resemblance is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, while the relation 
of imperfect resemblance can be shown to be reflexive, symmetric and non-transitive. 
Natural classes of module tropes 
or modifier tropes?
Ehring has considered several objections against the view that universals can 
be substituted for natural classes of tropes: some collapse objections (cf. Ehring, 
2011, p. 193-202), which Ehring calls the ‘classic objections’ related to modal is-
sues about the conditions of identity of classes and causation (cf. Ehring, 2011, 
p. 203-226), and objections related to the determinable and determinate properties 
(cf. Ehring, 2011, 227-241). Although there is a great systematic interest in them, 
the focus will be put here on another kind of difficulties. These difficulties come 
from a generally ignored distinction between two different ways of understand-
ing the nature of a trope. Robert Garcia has called these different kinds of tropes 
“modifier tropes” and “module tropes” respectively (cf. Garcia, manuscript). The 
impact of the distinction on a conception of particular objects as bundles of tropes 
has been already described, but not the impact of the distinction on the conception 
of classes of tropes that can replace universals.
In our common conceptions of particular objects, they are thickly charactered 
entities, i.e. they are entities that have many different characters. “Character” here 
is a neutral denomination of whatever makes true the attributions we normally 
make to particular objects. Tropes in general are character grounders. The character 
they ground is non-shareable, in contrast with universals. The difference between a 
module trope and a modifier trope is that the former actually has the character it is 
grounding, while the latter  doesn’t. For example, if there is a sphere, the spherical 
character of the sphere is grounded in one or another trope the sphere possesses 
– assuming a general conception where properties are tropes. If one endorses a 
conception of modifier tropes, then the spherical character is something attributed 
directly to the sphere, while the modifier trope of sphericity is just a ‘spherizer’ that 
is non-spherical itself. The trope is something particular, that is numerically differ-
ent from the object it is characterizing and that grounds the spherical character of 
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the particular. If one endorses a conception of module tropes, on the other hand, 
the trope that grounds the spherical character of the sphere is itself spherical. The 
manner in which this trope grounds the spherical character is by directly having that 
spherical character. Module tropes are character entities, but thinly and not thickly. 
Why does this distinction matter? Because one should endorse one or the 
other conception. Suppose one is supporting the idea that particular objects are just 
bundles of tropes. In this case modifier tropes won’t work. Modifier tropes have no 
character themselves, they just ground the characters that some other entity has. 
If there are only tropes and no further kind of entity – like a substratum having the 
characters grounded in the tropes– then there is nothing to actually have any charac-
ter. The conception of modifier tropes, then, seems to work better with an ontology 
with properties and substrata. On the other hand, if one endorses a conception of 
module tropes, then problems seem to appear if one is proposing an ontology with 
tropes and a bearer of those tropes. In this case, tropes have characters. Some of 
them are spherical, some have a mass, some have an electrical charge, some have a 
size. The bearer of all those tropes has also a spherical shape, a mass, an electrical 
charge and a size. So it seems that one ends up with, at least, two spherical things, 
instead of one. Properties are causally relevant. Properties – or the possession of the 
property by an object, if you prefer – enter into causal connections. Objects with 
mass attract each other, because they have mass. If a massive object attracts another 
massive object, what massive character is causally relevant? The object’s massive 
character? The trope’s massive character? Both of them? A module conception of 
tropes connected with an ontology with tropes and a bearer of those tropes seems 
to imply either situations of causal overdetermination or situations in which there 
is an epiphenomenal character. So, a module conception of tropes seems to work 
better with a bundle theory of particulars (but cf. Garcia, 2011, p. 25-26). 
In the case of particular objects, there seems to be a clear connection be-
tween the two alternative conceptions of tropes. If one defends bundles of tropes 
as particular objects, then it is better to appeal to module tropes. If one defends the 
existence of a bearer of tropes, then it is better to appeal to modifier tropes. When 
it comes to classes of tropes that should satisfy the functions usually attributed to 
universals, though, the situation is not so clear. Ehring is a defender of a bundle 
theory of particular objects (cf. Ehring, 2011, p. 98-135), so he should endorse a 
module conception of tropes. Nevertheless, the examination here will not be re-
stricted to classes of module tropes, for there is an intrinsic systematic interest in a 
wider consideration of both alternatives. 
Classes of modifier tropes
Suppose, in the first place, that tropes are modifiers, and not modular. In this 
case, tropes have no character themselves but they ground the character of their bearer. 
It makes no sense to sort out tropes by their characters in resemblance classes – at 
least if the resemblance relation is supposed to be an internal relation – because there 
is no ‘intrinsic nature’ of the tropes by which they could be grouped together. Or, 
more carefully, there is an ‘intrinsic nature’ in those tropes, but it is just to be character 
grounders without character. All of them have the same ‘intrinsic nature’, but this 
‘intrinsic nature’ is not enough to discriminate between, for example, the resemblance 
class of spherical tropes and the resemblance class of 5-grams tropes. But objects do 
have a character and they are feasible candidates to enter into resemblance classes. 
They have shapes and mass and, hence, it makes sense to group them into resem-
blance classes of, for example, spherical objects and massive objects. The groupings 
of objects according to their respective characters can, then, motivate grouping the 
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tropes grounding those characters. There are no literally spherical tropes, but there 
are tropes that ground the spherical character of objects. Objective resemblances 
between objects can, then, be used to build resemblance classes of tropes. 
What is surprising here is that there is no resemblance between tropes. When 
it comes to resemblance classes, the situation is just like in resemblance nominalism. 
The fact that there are tropes grounding the characters of objects does not play 
any important role. One does not want any universal, so one proposes something 
to play the role of a universal. It is a class of particular entities, selected either 
because they are all and only the particular entities resembling each other, or just 
because it is a natural class. When one appeals to a ‘natural’ class it seems – prima 
facie – that objective resemblance has no role to play here. But, of course, it has. 
A ‘natural class’ is ‘natural’ because it grounds objective resemblances between the 
members of the class. Now, the situation is that the character of the objects enter-
ing either the resemblance classes or the natural classes should not be grounded in 
the intrinsic nature of those objects. Resemblance or pertaining to a natural class 
should be primitive unanalyzable facts – primitive facts about objects not tropes! 
These classes of objects are that which is relevant to specify further classes of tropes. 
When considering the theoretical situation without taking into account the 
differences between modifier and module tropes, one would be inclined to think 
that a feasible reduction of universals to classes of tropes should postulate – as 
presented above – that the nature of a trope comes from its pertaining to a resem-
blance class, or to its pertaining to a natural class. The fact, nonetheless, is much 
more convoluted. The nature of a modifier trope comes from its grounding the 
character of an object that pertains to a resemblance class or pertains to a natural 
class. The ‘intrinsic natures’ of tropes are ontologically dependent on the fact that 
the objects whose character they ground enter into some primitive resemblance 
relations with other objects, or pertain to certain natural classes. So, at last, the 
‘intrinsic character’ of a trope comes from the fact that objects enter into certain 
primitive resemblance relations or pertain to certain natural classes. All that is rel-
evant for the attribution of an ‘intrinsic nature’ of a trope is what is relevant for 
the attribution of an intrinsic nature to an object under resemblance nominalism. 
The problem here is that if this is the theoretical situation, most of the rationale 
for the substitution of universals by tropes disappears. Tropes are supposed to avoid 
the difficulties that haunt traditional forms of nominalism. Tropes are supposedly 
free from the problems of the ‘company’ and the ‘imperfect community’ because 
they are not thickly charactered like current objects. It happens now, nonetheless, 
that any kind of division of tropes into natural classes or resemblance classes will 
inherit all the problems that affect those forms of nominalism, because there is no 
‘intrinsic nature’ that can be attributed to those tropes, besides their grounding the 
characters – whatever they are – that comes from resemblance classes of objects or 
natural classes of objects. If one compares classes of tropes with classes of objects 
as ersatz universals, the supposed advantages of tropes over objects disappear. 
There is a further and – it seems – much serious difficulty with natural classes 
of modifier tropes or resemblance classes of modifier tropes. Endorsing this doctrine 
renders the direction of ontological dependencies10 rather obscure. In principle, it is 
10 The concept of ‘ontological dependence’ has not been easily analyzed. An obvious formulation is the 
following: x depends ontologically on y =df ((x exists)  (y exists)). It has the problem that it makes everything 
ontologically dependent on, for example, numbers (if there are any) and it cannot discriminate the direction of 
dependency between and object, say a, and its singleton {a} (cf. Lowe, 2009). Maybe one solution is to resort 
to the distinctions introduced by Fine in which ontological dependencies are connected to ‘essences’ (cf. Fine, 
1995). Maybe, also, one can simply postulate the relation of ontological dependence or ‘grounding’ as a primitive 
irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive relation (cf. Schaffer, 2009). This last option will be preferred in this work. 
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supposed that – in the context of a trope ontology – characters of objects are grounded 
on the tropes those objects posses. But those tropes have no intrinsic nature besides 
the natural classes to which they belong, or the resemblance classes in which they are 
included. These natural classes or resemblance classes of tropes – as the case might be 
– are ontologically dependent on the resemblance classes or natural classes of objects. 
So, it seems to turn out that the character those tropes are grounding is dependent on 
the ‘intrinsic nature’ of the objects they are supposedly characterizing. The ‘intrinsic 
nature’ of a trope is grounded, then, on the ‘intrinsic nature’ of the objects bearing 
those tropes. But tropes are, in principle, character grounders of those objects them-
selves. So, it seems that there is a ‘grounding loop’ here. One option is to get rid of 
tropes as character grounders completely. If they don’t fulfill any useful theoretical 
function, why postulate them? Another option is to reject that the ‘intrinsic nature’ 
of a trope comes from the fact that objects that bear those tropes pertain to certain 
natural classes or resemble such and such other objects. But this second option fails, 
for tropes don’t have any intrinsic nature beside the character they are grounding. 
It is true that Ehring is free from these difficulties, because in the context of 
a bundle conception of objects module tropes and not modifier tropes should be 
preferred. This is an important systematic problem, though, and one that should 
be considered seriously by defenders of ontologies with tropes and substrata 
(cf. for example, Heil, 2003, p. 126-192, 2012, p. 12-32). 
Classes of module tropes
There is an important difference in the situation when it comes to natural 
classes of module tropes or resemblance classes of module tropes – as the case 
might be. In principle, module tropes do have a character, for they ground charac-
ters by having them. So, it is not necessary in this case to appeal to resemblance 
classes of objects to generate ‘intrinsic character’ in the tropes, as in the case of 
modifier tropes. As module tropes have an ‘intrinsic nature’ by themselves, they 
can be grouped ‘directly’ in resemblance classes or natural classes that, then, can 
fulfill the functions usually attributed to universals. 
The situation, though, as indicated above, is that no trope, modular or not, 
has any ‘intrinsic character’ by itself. Resemblances between tropes either are primi-
tive and external or they are grounded in the fact that those tropes belong to the 
same natural class, where ‘belonging’ is also a primitive external relation. Only by 
these primitive external relations can any ‘intrinsic nature’ be attributed to a trope. 
As ‘grounding’ is a transitive relation, characters are, finally, grounded on natural 
classes or resemblance classes. That is, the character of an object is grounded on 
its tropes. As tropes are here modular, they ground the character of the object that 
bears them or includes them by having that character. But the ground by which 
any modular trope can have any character is the fact that that trope resembles 
other tropes or the fact that that trope belongs to a natural class. In both cases, 
the character of a trope is grounded in primitive external relations. Hence, by tran-
sitivity, characters of objects are grounded on primitive external relations, just as in 
traditional nominalistic ontologies. 
That should not be a very important problem. Ehring’s ontological framework 
is a mono-categorial one, with tropes working both as objects and as universals. 
Working as objects, they are bundles of module tropes. Working as universals, 
those module tropes constitue natural classes – the same would have applied to 
primitive resemblance classes. It could be convenient, though, to consider the com-
parative advantages that a framework like this one has in relation to some forms 
of resemblance nominalism. Ehring’s ontology of tropes is mono-categorial, but it 
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is also mono-categorial the ontology of  the defender of resemblance nominalism. 
Ehring’s ontology explains the intrinsic character of objects by primitive external 
relations, and the same happens in resemblance nominalism. Ehring’s ontology 
has no universal entities, and the same happens in resemblance nominalism. So, 
what is the advantage of a trope ontology over classic resemblance nominalism? 
It cannot be quantitative economy: when the nominalist has just one entity, the 
defender of tropes has many. It cannot be qualitative economy: both ontologies 
are mono-categorial; they are even on this score.
One cannot appeal here, either, to the fact that tropes are charactered enti-
ties while objects obtain their character in resemblance nominalism from primitive 
external relations of resemblance, because the same applies now to the thin character 
eventually possessed by module tropes. I can imagine just one advantage for an 
ontology of module tropes. As module tropes are thinly charactered, they seem not 
to be affected by the challenges of the ‘company’ and the ‘imperfect community’ 
that haunt resemblance nominalism. The problem, now, is that precisely the recourse 
to primitive external relations to ground the character of those tropes eliminates 
the advantage of trope ontologies over resemblance nominalism11. 
The difficulties of the ‘company’ and the ‘imperfect community’ seem to come 
from the fact that objects are thickly charactered. Attention will be focused here on 
the ‘imperfect community’ challenge. Resemblance classes are supposed to do the 
work usually attributed to universals. Those resemblance classes are defined as the 
classes of all and only resembling objects. That is, any object that resembles each 
one of the objects belonging to one of the classes also belongs to the class, and 
any object that belongs to the class resembles each other of the objects belonging 
to the class (cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2002, p. 53-95). By definition, resemblance is 
here transitive, although in general imperfect resemblance is not. Suppose a class 
of three objects: a1 is red and spherical, a2 is spherical and has a height of 1 meter, 
and a3 has a height of 1 meter and is red. It happens here that a1 resembles a2 be-
cause both are spherical, a2 resembles a3 because both have a height of 1 meter, 
and a3 resembles a1 because both are red. This is a resemblance class, but our in-
tuition is that this class is not really selecting one property. Several strategies have 
been devised by defenders of resemblance nominalism to cope with this problem 
(cf. Lewis, 1999, p. 14-15; Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2002, p. 156-185). It is not necessary 
to enter into the details of those strategies. As objects have at the same time color, 
shape and height, cases like the one presented can appear. A sphericity trope, on 
the other hand, is just spherical. But is it? A sphericity trope is also co-located with, 
for example, a certain height and a certain color. So, it can enter in an imperfect 
resemblance class of tropes every one of which resembles all the others. For example, 
two tropes can resemble because they are co-located with something spherical – of 
course every trope is co-located with itself –, two tropes can resemble because they 
are co-located with something red, and two tropes can resemble because they are 
co-located with something of 1 meter of height. So, one can specify an imperfect 
resemblance class of tropes to which belong a red trope, a sphericity trope and a 
1-meter-height trope. The recourse to natural classes is of no avail here, because 
natural classes are ‘natural’ because they ground objective resemblances. Either there 
are primitive resemblances that generate an imperfect class of tropes like the one 
presented, or there is a natural class that grounds certain objective resemblances: 
exactly the objective resemblances generating the imperfect class indicated. 
11 Manley (2002) has argued before that resemblance classes of tropes suffer from the same classic problems 
of resemblance nominalism: the challenge of the ‘imperfect community’ and the ‘company’. The argument 
that is going to be presented here is independent from the arguments displayed by Manley. 
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The obvious rejoinder to this line of argument is to point out that ‘being co-
located with something spherical’ is not an intrinsic property or character. Under 
any analysis of ‘extrinsic property’ it turns out to be extrinsic, and not intrinsic, and 
resemblance classes or natural classes should be built upon ‘intrinsic’ characteris-
tics. The problem here is that there is no ‘intrinsic character’ for module tropes in 
advance and, then, there is no a priori distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
characters of those tropes. Consider again the dialectical situation. Module tropes 
got their ‘intrinsic character’ either by their entering into primitive external relations 
of resemblance or by their belonging to natural classes – which is also a primitive 
external relation. Only after the fact that a module trope has entered into any of 
these primitive external relations can any extrinsic attributions be distinguished from 
the intrinsic ones. There are no extrinsic attributions if there are no intrinsic ones. 
Before it is clear what the ‘intrinsic character’ of a trope is, it is also not clear what 
an ‘extrinsic’ attribution to it is. But, to fix the ‘intrinsic character’ of a module trope, 
primitive external relations are required. But those primitive external relations cannot 
discriminate between ‘resembling in respect of being spherical’ and ‘resembling in 
respect of being co-located with something spherical’. Hence, module tropes are 
as affected by imperfect classes as objects are. 
The ‘intrinsic character’ of a module trope comes just from the primitive exter-
nal relations of this trope with other tropes. It is not clear that those primitive external 
relations by themselves are really discriminating between, for example, resemblance 
relations that constitute imperfect communities of tropes like the one presented 
above and resemblance relations that can work as ersatz universals. There are no 
criteria in advance for distinguishing between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ characters so 
that imperfect communities can be blocked from the beginning. Of course, there is 
no problem if defenders of module tropes appeal to the same strategies that have 
been used by nominalists – multigrade relations of resemblance (cf. Lewis, 1999, 
p. 14-15) or the strictures imposed by Rodriguez-Pereyra (cf. 2002, p. 156-185) to 
evade imperfect communities. The point is that the overall situation between trope 
ontologies and nominalism is, again on this score, even. 
Conclusions
Ehring’s defense of natural classes of tropes can avoid several of the problems 
affecting the classical conception of tropes, as defended by D. C. Williams and Keith 
Campbell, for example. In the classic conception tropes have an ‘intrinsic qualita-
tive character’ and are also individuals per se. Their intrinsic character can ground, 
then, objective internal relations of resemblance with other tropes. The resemblance 
classes generated are supposed to work as universals. Tropes understood in this 
way, nonetheless, can enter into several different internal relations with the same 
entities, but that seems incompatible with a simple nature. By hypothesis, though, 
tropes are simple entities, not built up from a qualitative character and a particu-
larizer component.
The solution proposed by Ehring is similar to that entertained by nominalists. 
Instead of supposing that tropes have an intrinsic character that, afterwards, grounds 
internal relations of resemblance, classes that are supposed to work as universals 
should be built up from primitive external relations of resemblance or simply by natu-
ral classes, whose ‘natural’ character is also primitive. Ehring prefers natural classes, 
because they can ground a certain ‘intrinsic character’ in the tropes belonging to 
those classes and, then, can ground some internal resemblance relations, and also 
because they can ground the typical formal strictures of the resemblance relation. 
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It has been pointed out here that this theory can have wildly different con-
sequences if one understands the notion of ‘trope’ either as a modifier trope or 
as a module trope. A modifier trope is a trope that grounds a certain character in 
its bearer but it has none. A module trope is trope that grounds a character in its 
bearer by having one. Modifier tropes do not seem appropriate for bundle con-
ceptions of objects, so Ehring certainly should prefer module tropes. In any case, 
Ehring’s theory of natural classes as ersatz universals faces problems under any 
of those interpretations. If tropes are modifier tropes, the ‘intrinsic’ character by 
which tropes could be grouped in natural classes – or resemblance classes, as the 
case might be – is possessed by objects, not by tropes. Hence, classes of tropes 
have the same problems – no more, no less – as classes of resembling objects. If 
this is the situation, what is the advantage of a trope ontology over resemblance 
nominalism? It also happens under this supposition that it is not clear whether the 
characters of objects are grounded in the tropes they bear or the other way round. 
In effect, tropes can be said to have an ‘intrinsic nature’ here only because they 
are borne by objects that belong to several resemblance classes or several natural 
classes. The ‘intrinsic character’ of tropes, then, seems to be grounded in primitive 
external relations into which objects – not tropes – enter. 
If tropes are modular, problems seem less serious, but serious enough. Under 
this supposition tropes ground characters because they have them. For a trope to 
have a character, nevertheless, is to be a member of certain resemblance classes or 
certain natural classes, both of them generated by extrinsic primitive relations. The 
problem here is that the general ontology that results is – overall considered – less 
economical than plain resemblance nominalism. It means positing more entities 
than nominalists do and without further clear theoretical advantages over nomi-
nalism. The difficulty of the ‘imperfect community’ is considered here with some 
detail. The problem of the ‘imperfect community’ seems to come from the fact 
that objects are thickly charactered. But so are module tropes under the concep-
tion discussed are. A trope can be, for example, spherical, but also co-located with 
something red, and co-located with something of 1 meter of length. It is of no avail 
for the defender of tropes here to appeal to the ‘extrinsic’ character of attributions 
like ‘being co-located with something spherical’, because the only way to make a 
distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ characters is via the operation of the 
primitive external relations: primitive resemblance or belonging to a natural class. 
Of course, the defender of a trope ontology can apply the same resources to which 
resemblance nominalists have appealed. The point, though, is that trope ontolo-
gies finally turn out to be in no better position that plain nominalism. Why, then, 
postulate a less economical ontology? The rationale for trope ontologies ends up 
being seriously undermined12. 
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